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THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
SHOULD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ENCOURAGE STOCK 
MARKETS? 
 
(I)   
 
The Stock Markets and the Developing Countries: The Global Context 
 In a famous passage in chapter 12 of the General Theory, Keynes 
observed:  
As the organisation of investment markets improves, the risk of the 
predominance of speculation does, however, increase.  In 
one of the greatest investment markets in the world, namely, 
New York, the influence of speculation (in the above sense, 
i.e. `the activity of forecasting the psychology of the 
market') is enormous.   ... Speculators may do no harm as 
bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise.  But the position 
is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a 
whirlpool of speculation.  When the capital development of 
a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, 
the job is likely to be ill-done.  The measure of success 
attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which 
the proper social purpose is to direct new investment into 
the most profitable channels in terms of future yield, cannot 
be claimed as one of the outstanding triumphs of 
laissez-faire capitalism...[Keynes, 1936, pp 158-159]  
 
 Today, however, as a part of a general trend towards liberalisation, 
deregulation, privatisation, the diminution of the role of the state and 
enhancement of that of the market which for various reasons is sweeping 
the globe - the North and the South, what remains of the East as well as 
the West - an important feature of the development of the financial sector 
 
 
  3 
in a large number of developing economies is the very fast growth of stock 
markets in these countries.  The establishment and expansion of these 
markets is favoured not just by the Bretton Woods institutions, as one 
would expect, but also by many  heterodox economists as well those from 
the centrally planned economies. 
 
 The World Bank, particularly through its affiliate the International 
Finance Corporation (I F C) is actively involved in fostering stock market 
development in third world countries and in assisting and encouraging 
them to open up to foreign portfolio investment.  Specifically, the I F C 
provides technical assistance to a large number of countries on the legal, 
regulatory and fiscal issues involved as well as on other aspects of the 
institutional framework for the development of these markets.  According 
to Sudweeks (1989), from 1971 to June 1988, 73 countries requested and 
received capital market assistance in various forms from the I F C's 
Capital Markets Department.  In 50 of these countries assistance has been 
provided especially for the development of the security markets.  
Moreover, I F C's  pioneering work in establishing the Emerging Markets 
Data Base (E M D B), which since 1975 has been analyzing records of a 
large number of third world companies and providing basic information 
on many `emerging' stock markets, has been widely acknowledged to be 
instrumental in stimulating foreign investors interest in these markets.  
The I F C in addition has assisted several countries with the launching of 
the so-called `country funds' to attract foreign portfolio investment to 
developing country stock markets
1
. 
                                                 
    
1
 See further Sudweeks (1989) and Atkin and Dailami (1990). 
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 The Bretton Woods Institutions are of course much too 
sophisticated to admit to any ideological bias in their encouragement of 
third world stock markets.  It is suggested that the stock market expansion 
is in part a natural progression of the development of a country's financial 
sector as long term economic growth proceeds.  More importantly, it is 
argued that the existing financial systems, which in many countries have 
invariably involved government directed and often subsidised credit to 
priority industries or firms, have proved to be unsuccessful.  The 
Development Finance Institutes (D F I) have been the main vehicles for 
providing long term finance for industrial development in a number of 
countries.  The D F Is have been facing acute financial difficulties since 
the economic crisis of the third world began at the end of the 1970s and 
early 1980s.  The World Development Report for 1989, which focused 
on the financial sector, reported that `in a sample of eighteen industrial D 
F Is worldwide, on average nearly 50 per cent of their loans (by value) 
were in arrears, and accumulated arrears were equivalent to 17 per cent of 
the portfolio value.  For three of these institutions, loans accounting for 
between 70 and 90 per cent of the portfolio values were in arrears.  The 
situation may be worse than the numbers show, because the rescheduling 
of overdue loans and growing loan portfolios reduce arrears ratios.' (p.60). 
 The Report goes on to observe: `The performance of agricultural DFIs 
has also been poor.  Studies show default rates ranging from 30 to 95 per 
cent for subsidised agricultural credit programmes.' (p. 61).  In general, 
the Report argued strongly against the myriads inefficiencies of these DFIs 
and the bank- based `interventionist' financial systems; instead it favoured 
a restructuring of these systems in the direction of making them more ` 
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voluntary', fiscally neutral and for bringing them as far as practicable 
under private ownership. 
 
 Outside the circle of the Bretton Woods institutions and orthodox 
economists, a serious case for the expansion and liberalisation of the third 
world stock markets has recently been put forward by a group of 
economists and policy makers associated with the World Institute of 
Development Economics Research (W I D E R).  A WIDER Study 
Group, under the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Berrill, in its 1990 report 
on foreign portfolio investment in emerging capital markets, indeed called 
for the abandonment of section 3, Article VI of the IMF's articles of 
agreement.  This section states that `member may exercise such control as 
are necessary to regulate international capital movements', thus permitting 
countries to impose restrictions on foreign capital flows.  The Study 
Group's basic argument is made in the context of attracting international 
capital to developing countries when in the foreseeable future the 
commercial banks may be unwilling to lend to them because of the debt 
crisis.  Hence the need to encourage foreign portfolio investment, and 
therefore to expand and to liberalise the third world stock markets.  
However the Study Group go on to suggest:  
 
`The need to attract foreign capital in non-debt creating forms is 
only one reason, and not the most important reason, why 
developing countries should wish to foster their emerging 
equity markets.  Equity markets are a vital part of economic 
development — they encourage savings, help channel 
savings into productive investment and encourage 
entrepreneurs to improve the efficiency of investments.  
This report therefore, puts the role of the foreign investor 
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within the context of the general desirability of the growth 
of equity markets for domestic resource mobilisation 
reasons as well as for tapping foreign savings and 
know-how on market organisation and technology. 
[WIDER, 1990, p.6, emphasis in original]. 
 
 There is apparently an even wider group of admirers of the merits 
of the stock market.  The Chinese authorities in recent years have 
established embryo stock markets in Shanghai, Beijing and a number of 
other cities.  In his Report to the 13th Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party in 1988, the then General Secretary of the party Zhao 
Zhi Yang provided an ideological justification for the use of the stock 
market by a socialist economy.  He suggested that during the `primary 
state of socialism', and the `commodity production' stages of the 
development of a socialist economy, it is necessary to use various market 
forms including the stock market.  Zhao argued that such institutions 
should not simply be regarded as a preserve of  capitalism: socialism 
should also take advantage of them whilst minimising their harmful 
effects
2
.  Similarly President Gorbachev, in his address last year to the 
Supreme Soviet, outlining the economic reform programme for USSR, 
called for the establishment of stock markets in the country as an integral 
part of this programme.  
 
 The drive towards the setting up of stock markets in developing 
countries during the last decade is linked also to other important 
developments in the world economy.  Since the mid-1970s, the financial 
markets of the advanced industrial countries have undergone far-reaching 
                                                 
    
2
 For a full discussion of the role of the stock market in a socialist economy, see Singh (1990). 
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changes and become increasingly integrated.  As Cosh, Hughes and Singh 
(1989) observe these changes have arisen from the operation of a number 
of interrelated factors: (a) the progressive deregulation  of financial 
markets both internally and externally in the leading countries; (b) the 
internationalisation of these markets; (c) the introduction of an array of 
new financial instruments allowing more risky and bigger financial 
investments; and (d) the emergence and the increasing role of new players 
on the markets, particularly the institutional investors.  The developments 
in the advanced countries financial sectors has in turn led them to seek 
liberalisation in the international trade and exchange of services in the 
current Uruguay Round of trade talks.  The establishment of stock 
markets in developing countries and opening them to foreign security 
houses as well as to foreign portfolio investors can be viewed as a part of 
this global liberalisation project. 
 
II.  The Stock market and Economic Development: Analytical and Policy 
Issues 
 Notwithstanding the present almost universal enthusiasm for the 
stock markets, it is important to be cautious about the role of these markets 
in economic development.  This is not just because of Keynes's 
skepticism, as expressed in the passage at the beginning of this essay, 
about the virtues of the stock market in relation a country's investment 
needs.  Ironically an important debate is taking place today in the US and 
the UK themselves — countries where the stock market reigns supreme — 
about the deleterious role of the market in relation to their competitiveness 
vis a vis West Germany and Japan.  In its leader of 24 April 1990, the 
Financial Times, normally a keen supporter of freely functioning markets 
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observed: 
 
The big problem for industry in the English speaking economies is 
a loss of competitiveness in world markets.  The key to 
regaining competitive advantage must lie in the creation of a 
healthy climate for innovation and investment.  Yet the 
linkage between ownership discipline in open capital 
markets and innovation is exceptionally imprecise and there 
are grounds for suspecting the discipline is indeed 
dangerously short term.  A striking feature of many of the 
more significant technological advances and their financing 
in post-war Britain is how often success has been achieved 
under the umbrella of private or restricted voting ownership 
structure — witness Pilkington's float glass process, 
Reuters' dealing system or 3i's dominant position in venture 
capital.' 
  
 The Financial Times was simply echoing the concern of a number 
of economists as well as industrialists on both sides of the Atlantic who 
believe that the equity-market based financial systems, and the `short 
termism' it inevitably generates, have put the Anglo-saxon countries at a 
competitive disadvantage in relation to Japan and West Germany where 
the equity markets play a far less significant role.  It is argued that as a 
result of the pressures generated in part by the market for corporate control 
with its hostile takeovers, leveraged buy-outs and mergers, the 
Anglo-saxon corporate managers consistently invest much less in long 
term projects than their German and Japanese counterparts where hostile 
takeovers are an extremely rare phenomenon.  
 
 In view of these contradictory assessments of the role of the stock 
market for competitiveness and long term investment and innovation, it is 
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essential for the developing countries before they go too far in this 
direction to ask how precisely do the stock markets help in the 
industrialisation process.  Specifically, the following issues need careful 
investigation.   
(a) What are the channels through which the establishment of a 
stock market fosters economic and industrial development 
in a country? 
(b) How well do such channels operate in practice in countries 
which have well functioning stock markets? 
(c) How are stock markets likely to function in the particular 
circumstances of developing countries? 
(d) If stock market are established, can the developing countries 
avoid their negative effects as Zhao Zhi Yang was 
suggesting?   
(e) Are there feasible alternatives to stock market-based financial 
systems?  Will the developing countries be better off with 
such alternatives systems?   
 
 These questions will be systematically examined in the following 
sections.  But first section III will report on the growth of the stock 
markets in developing countries in recent years. 
 
III. The Third World Stock Markets in the 1980s 
 The main source of information on the third world stock markets 
and their performance is the Emerging Markets Data Base of the IFC.  
The IFC monitors 19 developing country stock markets on a fairly 
comprehensive weekly basis; it also keeps less detailed records of a 
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further eleven.  Table 1, based on IFC data, provides figures on market 
capitalisation and on the numbers of listed companies for a selection of 
`emerging' and developed country stock markets in the 1980s. 
 
 The table shows the very rapid extension of the third world stock 
markets during the last decade.  The total value of the shares listed on 
these markets increased seven fold in US dollar terms between 1980 and 
1989 - a much faster rate of growth than in the developed stock markets 
whose markets capitalisation rose four fold over the same period.  The 
number of companies listed on the emerging stock markets almost 
doubled during the 1980s; by 1989 over ten thousand companies were 
listed on these markets.  In terms of listed companies, the Indian stock 
exchanges with nearly six thousand listings were by far the biggest in the 
world.  Most of these  
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Table 1 
 
Market Capitalisation and Numbers of Domestic Listed Companies: 1980 and 1989 
Emerging and Developed Country Stock Markets 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
 
   No of Listed 
  Market Capitalisation Companies  
     
   
 1980 1989 1980 1989 
 
Emerging Markets 
 
Taiwan 6,082 237,012 102 181 
S. Korea 3,829 140,946 352 626 
Brazil (Sao Paulo) 9,160  44,368 426 592 
Malaysia 12,395  39,842 182 251 
India (Bombay) 7,585  27,316 2,265 6,000* 
Thailand 1,206 25,648  77 175 
Mexico 12,444 22,550 259 203 
 
 
IFC Composite Markets** 84,761 596,219 5,079  9,767 
All Emerging Markets 86,125 611,130 5,531 10,582 
 
 
 
Developed Markets 
 
Japan 379,679 4,392,597 1,402 2,019 
U.S. 1,448,120 3,505,686 6,251 6,727 
U.K. 205,200 826,598 2,655 2,015 
Italy 25,300 169,417 134  217 
Sweden 37,600 119,285 103 135 
Norway 3,190 25,285 117 122 
Austria 2,000 22,261 66 81 
 
 
All Developed Markets 2,651,956 11,095,353 15,694 18,690 
—————————————— 
* Estimated for all Indian stock markets 
** Emerging markets included in IFC index 
Source: Compiled from IFC (1990) 
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companies are of course very small, so that in terms of total capitalisation, 
the Indian market was less than an eighth of the size of Taiwan's (in 1989) 
and of course it was tiny compared with the larger developed country 
markets.  Nevertheless, as Table 1 indicates that even with respect to 
market capitalisation, the Bombay stock exchange (as well as a number of 
other emerging stock markets) are larger than the stock markets of smaller 
European countries such a Sweden, Norway or Austria.  The biggest third 
world stock markets, namely Taiwan, is in fact now considerably larger 
than the Italian stock market. 
 
 Table 2 below provides information on market capitalisation 
relative to GNP for the emerging markets.  At the end of 1988, the value 
of stocks listed on the IFC sample of thirty developing country stock 
markets constituted together about four per cent of the 
————————————————————————————————————————— 
Table 2 
 
Market Capitalisation* Relative to GNP** 
Emerging and Developed Country Stock Markets 1988-89 
 
  Taiwan  118.3 
  S.Korea  71.4 
  Brazil (Sao Paulo)  8.4 
  Malaysia  69.1 
  India Bombay  8.7 
  Thailand  16.9 
  Mexico  16.8 
 
 All 30 Emerging Markets in IFC Sample  21 
  All Developed Country Markets  65 
 
 *End of Sept.1989.  ** End of 1988 
 Source: WIDER (1990) and IFC Emerging Markets Data Base 
total capitalisation of the world stock markets.  The corresponding 
combined GNP of the same countries amounted to eleven per cent of the 
world GNP, which indicates much lower capitalisation in relation to GNP 
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for developing countries compared with the  developed economies.  
However as Table 2 shows that even on this criterion, the Taiwanese the 
South Korean and the Malaysian markets were by the end of 1980s larger 
than the average stock market in the developed countries.  In relation to 
GNP, market capitalisation in other emerging markets is much smaller 
than that for the average developed country market.   
  
 The seven emerging markets listed in Tables 1 and 2 are the largest 
third world stock markets and together constitute nearly 90 per cent of the 
total market capitalisation of the thirty developing country markets in the 
IFC sample.  South Korea and Taiwan alone account for more than 60 per 
cent of the emerging markets' combined capitalisation.  Table 3 indicates 
that in general the emerging markets also individually exhibit greater 
concentration than developed country stock markets.  At the end of 1989, 
the share of total market capitalisation accounted for by the ten largest 
stocks was greater than 60 per cent in Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, 
Jordan and Turkey.  Although comparable data for developed country 
markets is not available, the generally high figures for the share of value 
traded held by ten most active stocks in the second columns of Table 3 
suggests that most third world markets are fairly `thin'. 
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Table 3 
 
Market Concentration: Share of Market Capitalisation Held by Ten Largest Stocks* and Share 
of Value Traded Held by Ten Most Active Stocks* End 1989 
 
 
 
————————————————————————————————————————— 
 Share of market capital- Share of value traded 
 isation held by ten held by ten most 
Market largest stocks, end 1989 active stocks, 1989 
————————————————————————————————————————— 
Latin America 
Argentina 67.7 83.5 
Brazil 22.5 31.0 
Chile 47.2 67.1 
Colombia 71.7 61.5 
Mexico 36.3 44.6 
Venezuela 65.4 71.5 
 
East Asia 
Korea 19.2 22.7 
Philippines 32.1 32.7 
Taiwan, China 38.0 16.6 
 
South Asia 
India 20.8 47.3 
Malaysia 37.7 16.2 
Pakistan 19.3 18.2 
Thailand 35.4 35.8 
 
Europe/Mideast/Africa 
Greece 53.1 65.9 
Jordan 61.3 50.9 
Nigeria 51.6 31.5 
Portugal 43.4 37.3 
Turkey 60.1 74.8 
Zimbabwe 45.9 64.3 
 
Developed markets 
Canada 24.2 - 
France 24.5 - 
Germany 41.9 - 
Japan 19.5 - 
Switzerland 48.9 - 
U.K. 21.9 - 
U.S.A. 13.7 - 
————————————————————————————————————————— 
 
*Stocks in the IFC Composite Index Relative to the Total Stock Market. 
Source: IFC (1990), p.19. 
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 Tables 4 and 5 provide information on the performance of shares 
on the 19 emerging stock markets in the IFC composite index.  Table 4 
shows that in 1989, the average price-earnings ratio of Taiwanese stocks 
was a little over 50, almost the same as the average ratio on the Japanese 
market.  Except for Brazil, all the leading third world stock markets 
recorded in that year price-earnings ratios considerably higher than those 
on the U.S. or the U.K.stock markets.  The average dividend yields in 
1988 and 1989 in Taiwan and South Korea were generally much lower 
than those in the other emerging markets.  The performance of the 
Taiwanese market appears to be very similar to that of Japan in this 
respect as well.  However a high price-earnings ratio does not necessarily 
imply a low dividend yield as the case of Brazil shows: in 1989 the stock 
market in that country recorded a relatively low price-earnings ratio (of 
8.1) and also one of the lowest dividend yields among the emerging 
markets. 
 
 From the point of view of an overseas investor in the developed 
countries what is important is the total return on the  shares - dividends as 
well as capital gains - expressed in terms of hard currency.  Fortunately 
the IFC calculates such indices for emerging markets (see Table 5).  The 
table shows that if we consider the period 1984 to 1989 as a whole, the 
`total return' on the IFC composite index of all emerging markets was not 
quite as good as that  
 
 
  16 
 Table 4 
 The Price-Earnings, Price-Book Value Ratios and Dividend Yields;Emerging and Developing Country Stock Markets 1988 and 1989 
{PRIVATE } Price/earnings ratio  Price/book value ratio  Dividend yield  
Market This year Relative to 
world  
One year 
ago 
This year Relative to 
world  
One year 
ago 
This year Relative to 
world  
One year 
ago 
Latin America          
Argentina 22.14 1.15 11.30 1.64 0.63 0.30 4.69 2.13 3.62 
Brazil 8.30 0.45 7.95 1.34 0.52 0.72 0.66 0.30 1.50 
Chile 5.82 0.30 4.40 1.33 0.51 1.11 9.5 4.32 9.38 
Colombia 6.96 0.36 8.75 1.08 0.42 1.59 7.05 3.20 5.93 
Mexico 10.66 0.55 5.04 1.03 0.40 0.69 2.10 0.95 3.02 
Venezuela 6.44 0.33 11.45 1.37 0.53 2.31 2.21 1.00 1.10 
          
East Asia          
Korea 38.57 2.00 39.51 2.50 0.96 3.34 1.26 0.57 0.54 
Phillipines 18.50 0.96 9.92 4.35 1.67 2.75 1.10 0.50 2.23 
Taiwan, China 51.71 2.65 40.23 6.55 2.52 4.57 0.58 0.26 0.61 
          
South Asia          
India 18.34 0.95 21.51 3.46 1.33 2.46 1.93 0.88 3.23 
Malaysia 30.75 1.59 24.14 3.34 1.28 2.58 2.19 1.00 2.04 
Pakistan 8.44 0.44 9.37 1.80 0.69 1.68 8.26 3.75 7.93 
Thailand 23.07 1.20 12.62 8.06 3.10 3.41 7.94 3.61 4.01 
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 Table 4 (continued) 
 
 The Price-Earnings, Price-Book Value Ratios and Dividend Yields;Emerging and Developing Country Stock Markets 1988 and 1989 
 
 
 
{PRIVATE } Price/earnings ratio  Price/book value ratio  Dividend yield  
Market This year Relative to 
world  
One year 
ago 
This year Relative to 
world  
One year 
ago 
This year Relative to 
world  
One year 
ago 
Europe/Mideast/Africa          
Greece 24.30 1.26 10.59 3.12 1.20 2.33 4.62 2.10 5.62 
Jordan 14.93 0.77 17.30 1.88 0.72 1.48 2.38 1.08 3.40 
Nigeria 6.99 0.36 6.07 1.83 0.70 3.46 7.33 3.33 8.96 
Portugal 21.42 1.11 26.50 3.79 1.46 4.36 1.87 0.85 1.34 
Turkey 17.64 0.91 2.62 7.18 2.76 1.53 3.61 1.64 11.24 
Zimbabwe 7.00 0.36 4.24 1.27 0.49 4.00 9.75 4.43 7.79 
          
Developed Markets           
France 12.50 0.65 12.60 2.09 0.80 1.82 2.70 1.23 2.80 
Germany 17.80 0.92 15.60 2.39 0.92 1.89 2.90 1.32 3.60 
Japan 51.90 2.69 53.80 4.79 1.84 4.79 0.40 0.18 0.50 
United Kingdom 11.70 0.61 10.40 1.95 0.75 1.08 4.50 2.05 5.00 
United States 14.10 0.73 11.60 2.16 0.83 1.81 3.30 1.50 3.70 
World 19.30 1.00 18.10 2.60 1.00 2.41 2.20 1.00 2.40 
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Table 5  
 
The `Total Return' (a) Indices: Emerging and Developed Country Stock Markets 
1984-89 
 
 
{PRIVATE 
}Market 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Index       
IFC Composite 100.0 128.3 144.1  166.2 267.3 415.4 
IFC Latin America 100.0 179.2 168.8 103.3 200.4 331.5 
IFC Asia 100.0 98.1 134.9 193.6 354.9 558.4 
S&P 500 100.0 131.7 156.2 164.4 191.5 251.9 
EAFE 100.0 156.7 266.3 332.7 427.9 474.1 
       
IFC Composite - 28.3 12.3 15.3 60.9 55.4 
IFC Latin America - 79.2 -5.8 -38.8 94.1 65.4 
IFC Asia - -1.9 37.5 43.5 83.3 57.3 
S&P 500 - 31.7 18.6 5.2 16.5 31.6 
EAFE - 56.7 69.9 24.9 28.6 10.8 
 
(a) Dividend plus capital gain 
Source: IFC (1990), p. 19. 
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on the stocks in the Europe, Australia and Far East Index (EAFE).  It is 
also significant that if we consider the period before the 1987 crash, the 
total return on the emerging market stocks was generally lower or almost 
the same as that on the Standard and Poor 500.  Since the crash, the 
performance of the emerging markets has been far better than that of firms 
in the Standard and Poor 500, with the average total return index 
increasing by 60 per cent in 1988 and a further 55 per cent in 1989 on the 
third world stock markets compared with a much smaller corresponding 
growth in the total return on the shares in the Standard and Poor 500.   
 
 Other salient features of the third world stock markets (for example 
their volatility, the correlation of their price movements with those in the 
advanced country markets, new issues etc) will be discussed in subsequent 
sections.  However to round off this preliminary examination of the 
`emerging' markets
3
, tables 6 and 7 provide detailed information on the 
behaviour of two stock markets - those of South Korea and India - in the 
1980s.  These tables bring out more clearly the enormous expansion of 
each of these markets during the last decade.  Although market 
capitalisation and trading volume rose four and five folds respectively in  
 
                                                 
    
3
  The IFC uses the term `emerging' markets for all developing country stock markets.  However, as 
a historical footnote it is important to remember that some of these markets have been around for a very 
long time indeed.  Informal trading in shares in Bombay goes back to 1830s.  However what it clear is 
that the main impetus for the growth of most of these markets has come in the 1970s and particularly in 
the 1980s. 
 
US dollars terms in India during the 1980s, on the Korean market, the 
corresponding growth of total capitalisation was more than thirty fold and 
that of trading volume almost sixty fold.  The figures in table 7 also bring 
out the magnitude of the stock market  boom in Korea over the period 
1985 to 1988.  In local currency terms the Korean share prices increased 
five fold over this period whilst the `total return' index in US dollars rose 
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by a multiple of 6.  
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Table 6 
The Stock market in Korea: Chief Characteristics: 1980-89 
 
{PRIVATE } 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
A. Number of Listed Companies           
Korea Stock Exchange 352 343 334 328 336 342 355 389 502 626 
B. Market Capitalization           
1) In billions of won 2,527 2,959 3,301 3,490 5,149 6,570 11,994 26,163 64,544 95,477 
2) In millions of US dollars 3,829 4,224 4,408 4,387 6,223 7,381 13,924 32,905 94,238 140,946 
C. Trading Value           
1) In billions of won 1,134 2,534 1,974 1,753 3,118 3,621 9,598 20,497 58,081 81,200 
2) In millions of US dollars 1,867 3,721 2,700 2,260 3,869 4,162 10,889 24,919 79,180 121,264 
3) Turnover ratio 44.2 92.4 63.1 51.6 72.2 61.8 103.4 107.4 128.1 101.5 
D. Local Index           
1) KSE Composite Index (Jan. 1980=100) 106.9 131.4 127.3 121.2 142.5 163.4 272.6 525.1 907.2 909.7 
2) Change in index (%) -10.2 22.9 -3.1 -4.8 17.5 14.7 66.9 92.6 72.8 0.3 
E. IFC Emerging Market Data Base           
1) Number of stocks 25 25 25 25 25 25 23 23 62 61 
2) Share of market cap. (%) 22.1 28.4 27.3 27.6 24.8 32.5 39.3 24.4 58.8 45.7 
3) P/E ratio - - - - - - 25.7 21.7 39.5 38.6 
4) P/BV ratio - - - - - - 2.5 2.5 3.3 2.5 
5) Dividend yield (%) 8.6 6.3 6.1 5.2 4.7 4.1 2.7 2.1 0.5 1.3 
6) Total return index (Dec. 1984=100) 57.8 81.9 84.5 82.1 100.0 138.5 260.8 365.4 788.6 797.2 
7) Change in total return index (%) -36.2 41.8 3.1 -2.9 21.8 38.5 88.3 40.1 115.8 1.1 
F. Economic Data           
1) Gross domestic product (in US $ millions) 62,418 69,048 72,376 78,638 85,445 86,792 98,307 131,337 170,828 - 
2) Consumer price index (1980=100) 100 121 130 135 138 141 145 149 160 - 
3) Exchange rates (end of period) 659.8999 700.5000 748.7998 795.5000 827.3999 890.1999 861.4000 795.1000 684.9000 677.4000 
4) Exchange rates (average of period) 607.4232 681.0283 731.0839 775.7482 805.9758 870.0197 881.4500 822.5700 733.5390 669.6100 
  
 - Not available 
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 Source: IFC (1990), p. 96. 
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 Table 7 
 The Stock Market in India: Chief Characteristics 1980-89 
{PRIVATE } 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
A. Number of Listed Companies           
1) Bombay Stock Exchange 992 1,031 1,106 1,151 1,295 1,529 1,912 2,095 2,240 2,390 
2) Calcutta Stock Exchange 891 1,068 1,305 1,218 1,862 1,980 2,113 2,073 2,233 2,407 
3) All India 2,265 2,114 3,358 3,118 3,882 4,344 4,744 5,560 5,841 6,000  
B. Market Capitalization           
1) In rupees 60,147 107,389 110,761 89,300 99,840 174,750 178,300 186,650 358,150 460,000 
2) In US dollars 7,585 11,802 11,497 8,510 8,018 14,364 13,588 14,480 23,845 27,316 
C. Trading Value           
1) In rupees 21,700 63,950 47,560 24,010 44,500 61,340 135,960 87,400 170,035 280,320 
2) In US dollars 2,760 7,386 5,030 2,377 3,916 4,959 10,781 6,743 12,241 17,362 
3) Turnover ratio 40.3 76.3 43.6 24.0 47.1 44.7 77.0 47.9 62.4 68.5 
D. Local Index           
1) F.E. Bombay Index (1979=100) 123.6 175.2 166.9 182.8 199.8 396.4 424.8 389.9 634.5 839.9 
2) Change in Index (%) 23.6 41.8 -4.8 9.6 9.3 98.4 7.2 -8.2 62.7 32.4 
E. IFC Emerging Markets Data Base           
1) Number of stocks 25 25 25 25 25 25 47 40 40 60 
2) Share of market cap. (%) 19.5 16.4 16.1 22.4 23.6 27.6 45.9 40.2 33.2 46.0 
3) P/E ratio - - - - - - 18.0 22.0 21.5 18.3 
4) P/BV ratio - - - - - - 3.5 1.9 2.5 3.5 
5) Dividend yield (%) 3.8 3.2 3.7 3.2 3.4 2.0 2.6 2.7 3.2 1.9 
6) Total return index (Dec. 84=100) 80.2 103.8 101.4 102.9 100.0 205.1 199.3 168.8 232.2 242.8 
7) Change in total return index (%) 37.2 29.5 -2.4 1.5 -2.8 105.1 -2.8 -15.3 37.6 4.5 
F. Economic Data           
1) Gross domestic product (in US $) 172,725 184,120 187,822 205,242 202,015 211,609 232,168 254,948 - - 
2) Consumer price index (1980=100) 100 113 122 136 148 156 170 184 202 - 
3) Exchange rates (end of period) 7.9302 9.0992 9.6339 10.4932 12.4514 12.1655 13.1220 12.8900 15.0200 16.8400 
4) Exchange rates (average of period) 7.8629 8.6585 9.4551 10.0989 11.3626 12.3687 12.6110 12.9620 13.8903 16.1457 
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   All data for the Bombay Stock Exchange only, except as noted.  See. p. 149 for information on other principal exchanges.    Estimated - Not available 
 Source:  IFC (1990), p. 88. 
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IV. Theories of Finance and Economic Development: Alternative 
Perspectives 
 Before we consider the transmission mechanism - the precise 
channels through which the stock market may help or hinder economic 
development -it will be useful to examine the broader issues of the role of 
finance in economic growth from alternative theoretical perspectives.   
 
IV.1 - The Neoclassical and Keynesian Perspectives: The Well 
Developed Capital Markets 
 Since the late 1950s and until recently the modern neoclassical 
view of finance has been dominated by the so-called `irrelevance 
theorems' associated with Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1961]
4
.  In 
seminal contributions starting with their pioneering 1958 paper, 
Modigliani and Miller put forward two central propositions above the 
theory of finance.  They showed that in fully developed capital markets, 
under neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition, no transactions 
costs and no taxation, even in a world of uncertainty, the stock market 
valuation of the firm is independent of its financing or dividend pay-out 
decisions.  On the basis of certain further restrictive assumptions about 
expectations and the nature of uncertainty (e.g. uniformity in expectations 
held by all investors on the stock market), it was established that the 
market would value the firm's shares entirely on the basis of its earnings 
prospects; share prices would be invariant to the capital structure of the 
firm or the extent it resorts to internal or external sources to finance its 
investment plans.  In a broader sense, the Modigliani and Miller theorems 
thus suggested a dichotomy between finance and the real economy: the 
corporate growth and investment decisions are dictated completely by 
`real' variables such as productivity, demand for output, technical progress 
and relative factor prices of capital and labour.  Finance in this paradigm 
is always permissive and simply facilitates the investment process. 
                                                 
    
4
  The following analysis in this sub-section is based on Singh and Hamid [1991]. 
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 The normal Keynesian perspective on the role of finance in 
investment and economic growth also assumes well developed but not 
perfect capital markets, particularly in relation to the costs, the reliability 
and the availability of relevant information on equal terms to all the 
participants in the market. (The significance of this point will become 
clear in the discussion in the following pages.) In the Keynesian view, 
investment is essentially determined by  `animal spirits', by businessmen's 
confidence and by expected demand.  Although in principle the rate of 
interest matters, in practice it is regarded as being relatively insignificant 
compared with the demand factors. 
 
 As they do not accept the assumption of perfect capital markets, 
Keynesian economists do not generally believe that the Modigliani and 
Miller propositions are operational in the real world.  These neoclassical 
irrelevance theorems also run contrary to the traditional conception of a 
firm's investment and financing decisions.  The traditional view was a 
so-called pecking order theory of finance, 
5
 which suggested that firms 
always preferred internal to external finance and if they had to use external 
finance, they would prefer to employ debt and only as a last resort equity 
finance.  The firm's capital structure and its dividend pay-out decisions, in 
this analysis, were important variables which had an independent 
influence on its share price.  More generally, the availability of the 
appropriate kind of finance could constrain a firm's growth or investment 
plans: this suggestion was often incorporated in the post-war 
microeconomic investment models in the Keynesian spirit 
6
. 
 
 Paradoxically, the above traditional theory of finance has been 
                                                 
    
5
   See for example Donaldson [1961].  See also Myers [1984, 1985] and Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Peterson [1988]. 
    
6
 See for example Mayer and Kuh [1957]; Mayer and Glauber [1964]. 
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resurrected and revalidated by a number of new theoretical developments 
of the last decade and by attempts to relax some of the highly restrictive 
assumptions of the Modigliani and Miller propositions.  With respect to 
the latter, it was noted at the simplest level that if taxation and possibility 
of bankruptcy and financial distress are introduced into the analysis this 
would produce an optimal capital structure for the firm and thus invalidate 
the Modigliani -Miller irrelevance theorems.  Many corporate tax 
systems, for example, allow interest to be deducted as costs, which 
provides a significant tax advantage to the use of debt finance.  There is, 
however, a trade-off, since too high a level of debt increases the risks of 
bankruptcy or financial distress in an economic downturn.  This simple 
trade-off model leads to an optimal debt-equity ratio for the firm which 
maximizes its stock market valuation 
7
. 
 
 More complex considerations and the new theoretical 
developments involving asymmetric information between insiders 
(managers) and outsiders (creditors or shareholders), problems of adverse 
selection, moral hazard, agency costs, signalling, transactions costs, lead 
to different costs of the various forms of finance 
8
 and can be shown to be 
broadly compatible with the `pecking order' type theory outlined above 
9
 . 
 In general, this far richer and more complete analysis of the issues points 
to the significance of the corporate capital structures and the financial 
decisions for the real economy.  As a minimum, the new models of the 
                                                 
    
7
 The taxation argument is of course far more complicated than is suggested in the simple model 
outlined here, which abstracts inter alia from important issues of personal taxation.  There is a very 
large literature on this subject.  See, among others, King [1977]; Auerbach [1979]; Auerbach and King 
[1983]; Miller [1977]; Di Angelo and Masulis [1980]; Poterba and Summers [1985]. 
    
8
 There is again a very large literature which has developed in this area during the last decade or so.  
See among others: Jensen and Meckling [1976]; Myers [1977]; Ross [1977]; Grossman and Stiglitz 
[1980]; Grossman and Hart [1982]; Myers and Majluf [1984]; Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss [1984]; 
Stiglitz [1985]; Williamson [1988].  For a non-technical review of this literature, see Edwards [1988].  
See also footnote 11 below where simple explanations for a number of key concepts in the theory of 
imperfect information is provided. 
    
9
 See for example Fazzari et al [1988]; Myers and Majluf [1984]; Myers [1977] [1984] [1985]. 
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firm suggest that `finance' is not simply a veil, but that there are very 
important interactions between corporate finance and the real economy.  
Thus contrary to the neoclassical investment models (see in particular the 
widely known contributions by Jorgensen and his colleagues) which have 
dominated the profession in the 1960s and 1970s, many economists in the 
1980s, particularly the post-Keynesian ones, regard `cashflow' and 
corporate retained earning as being a significant constraint on a firm's 
investment decisions. 
 
IV.2  Under Developed Capital Markets and Economic 
Development: Financial Repression, Financial Liberalisation and the 
Stock Market 
 The theories of finance outlined above have assumed the existence 
of well developed capital markets and, therefore, been mainly concerned 
with the advanced economies.  In relation to developing countries, where 
the capital markets are generally under-developed, there is another branch 
of neoclassical literature that is relevant.  This body of thought is 
associated with McKinnon and Shaw who in separate but broadly similar 
contributions since the mid-1960s have explicitly sought to relate capital 
market developments to long term economic growth in the developing 
countries.  This so-called Stanford School has inter-alia advanced the 
following main propositions
10
.   Firstly, `financial deepening' through 
growing financial intermediation and monetarisation of the economy aids 
economic development.  Secondly, `financial repression', whereby in 
many third world countries the governments keep the interest rates 
artificially low and provide subsidised credits either to favoured sectors or 
to themselves, is inimical to long term economic growth.  Thirdly, 
`liberalisation' of these repressed credit markets will foster development 
since by raising interest rates to their `equilibrium' levels leads not only to 
                                                 
 
    
10
  See Mckinnon [1973], Shaw [1973].  For a review of this literature, see Fry [1988]. 
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higher savings but also to more efficient use of investment resources. 
 
 All these assertions, particularly the last two, are highly 
controversial both at a theoretical level as well as empirically.  It is not 
our purpose here to provide a detailed analysis of these propositions but 
within the confines of this paper, very briefly, among other aspects, the 
Keynesian economists contest the McKinnon and Shaw hypotheses on the 
ground that the underlying model assumes that savings determine 
investment and that a full utilisation of resources is always guaranteed.  
Moreover they point out that whether or not higher interest rates in the 
formal sector, following liberalisation, will increase aggregate savings will 
depend on the saving behaviour of the losers and gainers from this 
process.  To the extent that the personal sector finances the investments 
of the corporate sector, which in developing countries is often highly 
geared, higher interest rates may reduce corporate profits and retain 
earnings.  The central point is that although the rise in interest rates will 
increase personal incomes, if the savings propensity of the personal sector 
is lower than that the corporate sector (which is likely), it would lead to a 
fall in total savings (Akyuz, 1991). 
 
 More importantly, whether for the above reasons or others, 
empirical evidence from many countries which have liberalised their 
credit markets and increased real interest rates does not indicate a 
systematic rise in aggregate savings.  As Cho and Khatkhate (1989) 
conclude from their recent analysis of the financial liberalisation 
experience of five Asian countries (South Korea, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
Philippines and Indonesia):  
 
Finally, financial reform, whether comprehensive and sweeping or 
measured and gradual, does not seem to have made any 
significant difference to the saving and investment activities 
in the liberalised economies.  It was believed until recently 
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that removal of the repressive policies would boost saving.  
The survey in this paper of the consequences of reforms 
does not reveal any systematic trend or pattern in regard to 
saving (and also investment), though it clearly demonstrates 
that reform has greatly contributed to the financialisation of 
savings.  In most of these countries, saving changed in a 
random fashion. 
 Akyuz [1991] reaches the same conclusion with respect to 
aggregate savings in relation to Turkey's liberalisation experiment during 
the late 1970s and in the 1980s. 
 
 As for the effects of credit market liberalisation on the efficiency of 
the investment allocation process, leaving aside the disastrous 
consequences of such liberalisation in the Southern Cone countries in the 
1970s, many successful economies have used subsidies, even negative 
interest rates, for long period of time as an important part of their 
industrial policies during the course of economic development.  This has 
certainly been true of Japan which has provided negative real interest rates 
to its favoured corporations for much of the post-war period of its most 
rapid industrialisation [1950 - 1973].  Thus Sachs [1970] notes in relation 
to Japan: 
 
Domestic capital markets were highly regulated and completely 
shut off from world capital markets.  The government was 
the only sector with access to international borrowing and 
lending.  Foreign direct investment was heavily 
circumscribed with majority ownership by foreign firms 
both legally and administratively barred.  During the early 
to mid-1950s, about a third of external funds for industrial 
investment originated in loans from government financial 
institutions, at preferential rates that varied across firms and 
industries.  These state financial institutions remained an 
important source of cheap financing until the 1960s. 
 
 As Amsden [1990] points out subsidies and directed credit have 
also been a central feature of South Korea's highly successful industrial 
policy during the last two decades. 
 
 Significantly, the McKinnon - Shaw analyses concentrated on 
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imperfections and repression of the third world credit markets and did not 
examine the role of the stock market.  Recent theoretical work in the 
`imperfect information' paradigm regards this as one of their serious 
shortcoming.  In a number of contributions, Stiglitz and others 
11
 have 
shown that even if the credit markets were perfect, because of asymmetric 
information between the suppliers (the banks) and users of finance 
(corporations), the market determined interest rates will not allocate credit 
efficiently.  As Hoffman and Stiglitz [1991] note because of imperfect 
information, the interest rate takes on the dual function of price as well as 
an instrument for regulating the risk composition of the lender's portfolio.  
This leads to the result that despite the existence of perfect competition in 
credit markets, if there is an excess demand for loans at a given interest 
rate, the banks may ration credit rather than raise interest rates. 
 
 It can further be shown that in these circumstances because of the 
operation of the `adverse selection effect' and the `incentive effect', given 
several groups of observationally distinguishable borrowers, imperfect 
                                                 
    
11
  See for example Stiglitz and Weiss [1981, 1983] and Stiglitz (forthcoming).  The terms "agency 
costs", "asymmetric information", "moral hazard", "adverse selection effect", etc. ,are basic concepts 
used in recent advances in the theory of imperfect information. The underlying ideas are fairly straight 
forward." Asymmetric information" may for example arise from the fact that in management controlled 
large corporations quoted on the stockmarkets, the managers and the shareholders do not have access to 
the same or symmetric information . Managers clearly know a great deal more about the operations and 
the future prospects of their corporations than do the shareholders; moreover, particulary if the 
corporation is not doing well, the managers have an incentive to conceal this information from the 
shareholders.  In principal ,the managers are supposed to be the agents of the firm's shareholders. 
However, since the objectives of the two groups may differ, in corporations where there is a separation 
of ownership from control , there is a "moral hazard" that the managers may pursue policies which 
promote their own ends at the expense of those of the shareholders. This also leads to the so-called 
"principal-agent" problem : how can the shareholders (the principals) ensure that the managers (the 
agents) act in the principals' interests rather than their own. This results in "agency costs" which derive 
from the costs involved in designing special incentive or monitoring arrangements for this purpose.   
 
The above concepts are applicable in many other areas of economics. The problems of "asymmetric 
information" are particularly rife in the credit markets : normally the creditors do not have the same 
information as the borrowers as to how the loans may be utilised. In view of these asymmetries and 
other imperfections in the information mechanism," adverse selection" may occur in otherwise perfect 
credit markets if, as interest rate rises,the riskier rather  than the more efficient borrowers may be more 
willing to contract loans at such interest rates.In order to avoid such "adverse selection", creditors even 
in perfect markets,  faced with an increase in the demand for credit , may prefer to ration loans at the 
current interest rates rather than to raise the rates. 
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information results in some groups being totally excluded from the credit 
market, although the expected returns of the excluded groups' investments 
may be higher than those of the groups that get credit.  (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Ordover and Weiss, 1981).  To reduce or to eliminate such 
inefficiencies, Cho [1986] argued that the credit markets need to be 
supplemented by a well functioning equity market.  He suggests that this 
is because `equity finance is free from adverse selection and moral hazard 
effects while debt finance is subject to them in the presence of asymmetric 
information.   ... In order for the lenders (debt finance) to allocate credit 
to firms as efficiently as equity investors, they must know one more 
parameter, the riskiness of each individual borrower.  Therefore, in a 
world of imperfect information, the existence of equity markets will 
enhance the allocative efficiency of capital'. (page 197, italics in original). 
 
 There is however a crucial informational assumption underlying 
Cho's analysis, namely, that `risk - neutral lenders and potential 
shareholders have the same level of information on firms as describe 
above, i.e., they can sort out among groups of borrowers whose expected 
productivities are the same but cannot sort them within groups according 
to their degree of riskiness.'  But how much information (relative to a 
bank) does an individual investor on equity markets have concerning 
management-controlled firms and their myriads investment projects?   
Equally importantly, if information is costly, what incentive does a small 
shareholder have for acquiring such information?  Cho's argument is 
exceptionally problematical in terms of the informational requirements it 
imposes on the individual equity investor; moreover it totally ignores the 
`agency problem' in management controlled corporations.  In a world of 
asymmetric information as well as the agency problem, the existence of a 
stock market may lead instead to even greater capital market inefficiencies 
as will become evident from the discussion in section V below. 
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 Finally, a general theoretical argument for third world countries to 
integrate their stock markets with those of other (advanced) countries and 
for global stock market integration has been advanced by Subrahmanyam 
[1975].  He examined the benefits of integration to `individual investors' 
under three alternative forms of utility functions (quadratic, exponential 
and logarithmic).  For two economies whose capital markets were being 
merged, for each of the three utility functions, Subrahmanyam, rigorously 
established that `international capital market integration is 
Pareto-optimal-the welfare of each individual in the two economies will 
generally improve and never decline.  When the correlation between the 
two market portfolios is perfectly positive, investors are no better off.  In 
all cases, the effect of the extension of the opportunity set nullifies the 
effect of a negative change in the wealth' (page 24). 
 
 However as Subrahmanyam himself recognises his model is a 
rather abstract one.  It ignores all the  relevant features of the real world 
stock markets which bear on the question of globalisation and integration: 
international takeovers and mergers, speculation, capital flight, the 
vulnerability of a national economy to international capital market 
instability as well as other international macroeconomic factors.
12
  The 
adverse consequences for the national economy resulting from the 
operation of any one of these factors will play havoc with the 
pareto-optimality result. 
 
 
V. The Stock Market and Economic and Industrial Development: The 
Channels of Transmission: Theories and Evidence
13
 
 From a general discussion of the theories of the financial sector and 
                                                 
    
12
  See Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1989] for a discussion of these factors.  See also section VII.3 
below. 
    
13
 The discussion in this section draws on my paper Singh, 1990. 
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the role of financing economic development, we return now to an analysis 
of the specific channels through which the stock market may affect 
industrial and economic growth.  In principle a well functioning stock 
market may help the development process in an economy through the 
following means:  
1. Growth of savings 
2. Efficient allocation of investment resources 
3. Better utilisation of the existing resources 
 
 These three central tasks are performed on the stock market by 
essentially two kinds of market mechanisms: the pricing process and the 
take-over mechanism.  The main issue relevant to this paper is how well 
do these mechanisms work in practice and how successfully are the above 
functions in fact performed in the real world.  We shall consider here 
evidence from the well organised stock markets of advanced economies 
 
 Needless to say there is a voluminous literature on this subject, but 
our discussion here will inevitably be brief and concentrate only on the 
essential points. 
14
 The stock market is supposed to encourage savings by 
providing households with an additional instrument which may better 
meet their risk preferences and liquidity needs.  In well-developed capital 
markets share ownership provides individuals with a relatively liquid 
means of sharing risk in investment projects.  In practice however, 
evidence from advanced countries indicates that the stock market 
performs this savings function not at all well.  As Mayer's [1990] analysis 
of flows of funds data for several industrial countries on a comparable 
basis  over the period 1970 to 1985 shows (see Table 8), the equity 
market's net contribution to investment needs of the non-financial 
corporate sectors both in the US and the UK was negative over this period. 
 What this indicates  
                                                 
    
14
 For a recent revue article on the subject, see Hughes and Singh [1990]. 
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Table 8 
 
Weighted Average Net Financing of Non-Financial Enterprises in Advanced Countries. 1970-85 
 
{PRIVATE } Canada Finland France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States 
Retentions 78.1 64.2 N.A. 72.6 N.A. N.A. 107.2 89.2 
Capital transfers .0 .2 N.A. 9.4 N.A. N.A. 2.7 .0 
Short term 
securities 
-1.2 4.1 N.A. -.1 N.A. N.A. 2.8 1.0 
Loans 15.9 27.8 N.A. 12.0 N.A. N.A. 2.2 25.4 
Trade credit -3.7 -1.8 N.A. -2.5 N.A. N.A. -1.7 -1.4 
Bonds 7.2 3.2 N.A. -1.9 N.A. N.A. -2.3 11.7 
Shares 2.2 -1.4 N.A. .6 N.A. N.A. -3.6 -2.8 
Other 1.0 6.5 N.A. 9.9 N.A. N.A. 3.5 -17.2 
Statistical 
Adjustment 
.5 -3.0 N.A. .0   100.0 100.1 
   Total 100.0 99.8  100.0   100.0 100.1 
 
Weights Used Above (The Product of Revaluation and Depreciation Factors) 
 
{PRIVATE } 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Canada .20 .39 .55 .69 .74 .78 .84 .88 .91 .89 .89 .89 .89 .93 .97 1.00 
Finland .29 .52 .70 .85 .90 .86 .87 .91 .91 .98 1.01 .94 .97 .97 .99 1.00 
Germany .11 .22 .32 .40 .46 .53 .59 .76 .71 .75 .78 .81 .87 .92 .96 1.00 
United Kingdom .32 .58 .79 .89 .90 .91 .93 .95 .95 .90 .87 .89 .93 .97 .99 1.00 
United States .17 .33 .47 .59 .62 .67 .73 .77 .78 .80 .79 .78 .81 .89 .94 1.00 
 
 Source: OECD Financial Statistics 
 Note: Numbers are percentages 
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   United Kingdom statistics refer to private enterprise.  If public enterprise were to be included, then Retentions, 97.5, capital transfers, 4.2; short-term securities, 2.1; loans, 5.9; trade credit, — 1.1; 
bonds,  — 1.7; shares, — 2.6; other, 2.4; statistical adjustment, — 6.5. 
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is that corporate new issues in these two countries were more than 
matched by a net redemption of corporate shares (mainly because of 
takeovers).  In other industrial countries, although new issues made a net 
positive contribution to corporate investment over the period considered, it 
was extremely small and amounted to no more than 2 to 3 per cent of the 
total.   
 Table 8 also indicates that in all countries the main source of 
corporate finance is `retain earnings'.  To the extent that the companies 
use external funds to finance their investment needs, in almost all 
countries, except the UK, bank finance is by far the most important source 
of outside funds.  Although they undermine the savings function of the 
stock market, from a theoretical standpoint, these results are not 
surprising: they are broadly in accord with the pecking order theory of 
corporate finance outlined earlier.   
  
 The pricing of shares is critical to how well can the stock market 
perform its allocative functions.  An efficient pricing process will reward 
the well managed and profitable firms by valuing their shares more highly 
than those of unsuccessful and unprofitable firms.  This mechanism 
lowers the cost of capital to the former and hence ensures a greater 
allocation of new investment resource to such firms at the expense of the 
latter group of firms who correspondingly face a higher cost of capital.  
Thus relative share prices of firms in an `efficient' pricing system should 
reflect their relative expected profitability. 
 
 Tobin [1984] has made a useful distinction between two concepts 
of  efficiency of share prices: the `fundamental valuation' efficiency and 
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the `information arbitrage' efficiency.  The latter refers to how quickly all 
available information is disseminated throughout the market and is 
incorporated in share prices; the former concept refers to the notion of 
efficiency outlined in the previous paragraph.  There is a large body of 
evidence from advanced country stock markets which indicates that share 
prices on these markets are generally efficient in the `information 
arbitrage' sense: all new information is immediately reflected in share 
prices.
15
  There is however far less evidence which suggests that actual 
prices which prevail on the London or New York  stock exchanges are 
`efficient' from a point of view of fundamental valuation, i.e. that relative 
share prices of corporations always reflect their true long term expected 
earnings.  Many empirical studies have called attention to myopia, fads, 
and the domination of stock market prices by short term considerations.
16
  
It is the influence of short termism and speculators on the stock market 
that had led Keynes in the General Theory to liken the stock market to a 
gambling casino. 
 
 Although "efficient" prices in the fundamental valuation sense are a 
necessary condition for the stock market to perform its developmental 
tasks, they are not sufficient.  Sufficiency requires in addition, the 
existence of an `efficient' takeover mechanism which can ensure that all 
those companies whose profitability under their existing managements 
was lower than what it could be under any other management, were 
                                                 
    
15
 See for example Keane, 1983. 
 
    
16
  See for example Shiller [1981]; Modigliani and Cohen [1979]; Poterba and Summers [1988]; 
Smith, Suchaneck and Arlington [1988]; Nickell and Wadhwani [1987].  For a careful recent review of 
the burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature in this area see Camerer [1989]. 
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acquired by the latter.  For large management controlled oligopolistic 
corporations in capitalist economies, for which the natural selection 
process on the product markets may not work, the takeover mechanism is 
the only effective marked-based disciplinary device
17
.  However, modern 
theorists of the firm and industrial organisation have argued in recent 
contributions that for a number of powerful reasons (e.g. the transactions 
costs, the `free rider' problem), even in principle, the takeover device may 
not work effectively even when the share prices are "efficient 
18
. 
 
 More significantly, empirical studies of the actual nature of the 
take- over selection process on the stock market show that contrary to the 
folklore of capitalism, in general it is not the case that only the 
unprofitable companies are taken over, or that greater the profitability (or 
the stock market valuation) of a company, the correspondingly lower its 
chances of acquisition.  Evidence from a wide range of studies for the 
UK, the US and other industrial countries indicate that the take-over 
selection takes place only to a very limited degree on the basis of 
profitability; it does so much more in terms of the size of the company.  A 
large, relatively unprofitable company has a much greater change of being 
immune from take over than a much more profitable but a small company. 
 In fact, in the real world stock markets, making an acquisition to increase 
size might itself become a tactic to avoid take over.  (Greer, 1986; Singh, 
1971). 
                                                 
    
17
 See further Singh, 1971, 1975; Meade, 1968; Alchian and Kessel, 1962; Manne, 1965.  Because of 
the so-called principle/agent problems in the large management controlled corporations, shareholders 
dispersed throughout society may not be able to get the managers to act in the shareholders' interests 
rather than in the managers' own self interest. 
    
18
 See for example Grossman and Hart [1980]; Stiglitz [1985]. 
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 If we turn from the question of what kinds of companies are taken 
over on the stock market and by whom to that of what happens to resource 
 use following takeover, the empirical evidence is no more reassuring.  In 
addition to their disciplinary role, takeovers also provide an important 
mechanism in a capitalist economy for the reorganisation of the capital 
resources of the society in response to changing technology, tastes, and 
market conditions.  However a wide range of empirical studies comparing 
pre - and post merger profitability indicate that, on average, the 
profitability of merging firms does not improve after merger.  To the 
extent that monopoly power of the acquiring company in the product 
market may increase as a consequence of takeover, this evidence is 
compatible with reduced efficiency in resource utilisation following 
mergers.
19
 
 
 If the post-merger outcome of the amalgamation process is 
considered in terms of the effect on share prices (rather than profits), the 
results of empirical studies suggest that the shareholders of the victims 
invariably gain as a consequence of takeover (due to the bid premia) 
whilst those of the acquirers do not.  These bid premia on taken over 
companies are regarded by economists who believe in the `efficiency' of 
the stock market pricing and takeover processes, as indicators of 
unrealised long-term efficiency gains.  It is however, more natural to 
think of them as arising from the `dual valuation' situation which exists on 
the stock market in relation to takeovers (Charkham, 1988; Plender, 
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  See Singh [1971, 75]; Meeks [1977]; Mueller [1980]. 
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1990): one is the normal day-to-day valuation of a small number of a 
company's shares which may be traded and reflects valuation at the 
margin; the other is the valuation for the control of the company as a 
whole when intra-marginal holders have to be bought out (Hughes, 1989). 
 The differences between these two valuations provide enormous 
opportunities for predators, speculators and others who may gain simply 
putting a `company into play' regardless of the economic and industrial 
logic of the acquisition. 
 
 To sum up the above analysis suggests that even with well 
organised and complex stock markets such as those which exist in the US 
and the UK, the stock market is unable to perform its disciplinary and 
allocative tasks at all well; nor is it conspicuously successful in promoting 
savings.  However the fact that the stock markets may not confer much 
benefit on the advanced countries does not mean that their influence is 
nevertheless generally benign or at least harmless.  As noted in Section I, 
there are unfortunately strong reasons to believe that the active role which 
the stock markets play in the US and the UK may actually be damaging to 
these economies.  This theme will be explored in the next section by 
comparing the characteristics and experience of the Anglo-saxon 
economies with those of Japan and West Germany where the stock market 
for historical reasons has traditionally had very little influence on 
industrial development. 
 
VI.  The Stock Market and International Competitiveness: The 
Financial Systems in the US and the UK Versus West Germany and 
Japan 
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 An active market for corporate control with its corollary of 
hostile takeovers is today a central feature of the finance-industry 
relationships in the stock market dominated economies of the US and 
the UK.  However the relationships between finance and industry are 
rather differently organised in Japan and West Germany.  In these 
countries there is a far greater role for the banks who tend to have a long 
term relationship with industrial corporations.  There is also a rather 
different status for the shareholders and the stock market in general than in 
the Anglo-Saxon economies.  Both in Japan and West Germany hostile 
takeovers are virtually absent.   
 
 As Mr. Kazuo Nukazawa, a managing director of Keidanren (the 
Japanese employers federation) explains: 
 
`Ours is not the rugged or brutal capitalism of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century.  When good management today 
involves not just production and sales but also integration 
with the corporate and social environment, a takeover 
objected to by such "stake-holders" is doomed to fail in the 
long run.
20
    
 
 In the Japanese scheme of things, the shareholders are placed a 
`distant last' as the Economist puts it, behind almost everyone else who 
has dealings with the company — the so-called stake-holders.21   The 
latter include managers, employees, creditors, banks, customers and 
suppliers and, if the company is a part of a large group, the parent 
                                                 
    
20
  Quoted in the Economist, 29 April, 1989. 
    
21
 Quoted in the Economist, 29 April, 1989. 
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company.  Takeovers cannot be successfully completed without the 
consent of the significant stake-holders in each case. 
 
 In West Germany also the incidence of hostile takeovers is very 
low.  Moreover, the size of the German stock market is relatively small; 
the ratio of marker capitalisation to GDP is about 25 per cent in Germany 
as compared to 80 per cent in Japan, 85 per cent in the UK, and 87 per 
cent in the US.  Of around 400 companies quoted on the German stock 
markets only about 30 have shares which are actively traded (the other 
companies being closely held and therefore much less subject to a 
takeover threat).   
 
 Recent academic research on both sides of the Atlantic links the 
competitive failure of the Anglo-saxon economies (relative to those of 
Japan and West Germany, for example) to the differences in the operation 
of the market for corporate control and other features of the financial 
systems of these countries.
22
  Very briefly, it is argued that for a number 
of reasons these stock-markets dominated financial systems of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries lead to short-termism, i.e. to shorter time horizons 
for corporate investment decisions.  Moreover, it is suggested that the 
expected rates of return on investments - dictated by the quarterly or 
six-monthly earnings-per-share requirements of the Anglo-saxon stock 
markets - are too high.  As Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1990] note, if the 
expected rate of return in, say, country A is significantly greater than in, 
say, a competitive country B, then, other things being equal, less 
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 See for example Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1990]; Frank and Mayer [1990]; Berger et.al [1989]. 
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investment will be carried out in A, since a number of projects which will 
pass the rate of return test in B will not do so in country A.  Since new 
products and technological developments are often closely connected with 
investment, country A will over time become increasingly less competitive 
in relation to country B.  This point is echoed in the recent MIT 
Commission Report on U.S.  industrial productivity (MIT, 1989), which 
suggests that U.S. industries have lost out to the Japanese not because 
Japanese wages are relatively low, but because the relative cost of capital 
and the expected rate of return in Japan are much lower.  The 
Commission gives examples of a number of American markets where 
Japanese have come in, accepted a very low rate of return, while the 
American companies have diversified and left those markets, since they 
could not accept such low returns. 
 
 The Japanese and also the West German financial systems, which 
are bank rather than stock-market-dominated, are thus on this analysis 
regarded as being much more conducive to the development of the real 
economy and to international competitiveness.  This modern thesis 
connects with an influential earlier analysis by economic historians, such 
as Gerschenkron [1962], Cameron [1967] and others, who called attention 
to the critical role of the banks in initiating and fostering industrial 
development during the last century in Germany, France and Japan. 
 
 Keynes observed in the General Theory: `the spectacle of modern 
investment markets has sometimes moved me towards the conclusion that 
to make the purchase of an investment permanent and indissoluble, like 
marriage, except by reason of death or other great cause, might be a useful 
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remedy for our contemporary evils.  For this would forced the investor to 
direct his mind to the long term prospects and to those only' (chapter 12).  
Characteristically Keynes puts his finger on a central analytical weakness 
of a stock market system with respect to the finance-industry relationship.  
An important feature of a stock market is that it provides the individual 
investor with more or less ready liquidity.  This is usually regarded as a 
virtue by the exponents of the stock market.  As Mr John Tagino, the then 
head of global equity trading at Merrill Lynch put it in relation to the 
global equities market for leading corporations: `(it) gives the customer 
the ability to have instant liquidity at any time of the day or night, he or 
she wants it'.
23
   However this `liquidity' also means that the investor need 
have no commitment to the long term future of the firm.  The 
bank-dominated financial systems are by contrast far better able to ensure 
such long term financial commitment to their client corporations.  
Moreover, unlike the small individual investor in a stock market system 
who has no incentive to gather the costly information to supervise and 
discipline managers in management controlled large corporations, the 
banks have both the incentive and capacity to subject corporate managers 
to much more stringent supervision.  The German-Japanese types of 
banks are thus able to cope far better with the problems of asymmetric 
information, agency costs, transaction costs than the Anglo-Saxon stock 
market system. 
 
 Finally, during the 1980s, the financial markets are being 
liberalised in most advanced countries, including the non-Anglo-Saxon 
                                                 
    
23
 Quoted in Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1989]. 
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ones.  However, the impetus for such liberalisation in countries like Japan 
and West Germany comes from the current imbalances in the world 
economy and from the US political pressure than from the exigencies of 
economic development.  For reasons given above investment and 
economic growth in the hitherto non-stock market economies are more 
likely to be harmed rather than helped by the globalisation and 
liberalisation of financial markets which is presently taking place. 
24
 
 
VII. Third World Stock Markets, Volatility, New Issues and Foreign 
Portfolio Investment 
 Apart from all the problems associated with the finance - industry 
relationships which well organised stock markets have, most third world 
stock markets are in their infancy.  They tend therefore to be shallow; 
they do not yet have fully developed systems of regulation, accounting 
standards, etc.  Although in all these respects, these markets may be 
expected to improve over time and behave more like advanced country 
stock markets, research suggests that they currently display certain special 
characteristics.  These will be briefly taken up in this section. 
 
VII.1  Volatility 
 Stock market prices tend to fluctuate more than other economic 
variables even in fully developed markets.  However, the high degree of 
volatility is a negative future of stock markets in that it can undermine the 
financial system as a whole; it also makes share prices much less useful as 
a guide to the allocation of resources.  Moreover to the extent that they 
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discourage risk-averse savers and investors, stock market fluctuations may 
raise the cost of capital to corporations.  After the 1987 stock market 
crash, several enquiries were undertaken in the United States (e.g. the 
Brady Commission) to see whether as a result of financial liberalisation 
and global trading, or the introduction of new technology and devices such 
as programme trading, stock market volatility on the U.S. market has 
increased, and how in any case it can be reduced.  Evidence however 
indicates that volatility on the US market in the 1980s has been much in 
line with the long term historical record; it has in fact been less in the last 
decade than in the 1930s.  (Schwert, 1989).  Nevertheless it remains a 
cause for concern and several proposals have been put forward to reduce 
share price fluctuations, e.g. suspension of share trading if the stock 
market index falls by more than a specific percentage in a trading period. 
 
 However the capital markets of developing countries exhibit much 
greater volatility than those of advanced economies.  As table 9 indicates, 
during the period 1984 to 89, the standard deviations of monthly 
percentage changes in share price on the emerging markets tended to be 
considerably higher than those on the US, the UK or the Japanese stock 
markets.  To illustrate, the figures for the IFC combined index for Latin 
America in table 9 suggest that on average over this period share prices on 
the Latin American markets arose by about 2.5 per cent per month in US 
dollars terms, but on the assumption that percentage monthly price 
changes are normally distributed, in two third of the months they could 
have fallen by fourteen per cent or risen by fourteen per cent.  In another 
thirty per cent of the months they could have fallen or risen by twenty 
eight per cent. 
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 Turning to individual country stock markets, between 1982 and 
1985, share prices on the Brazilian stock market rose five fold (in US 
dollars terms); two year later they dwindled to twenty eight per cent of 
their 1985 value.  In the first nine months of 1987, share price on the 
Mexican stock market rose six-fold.  However, following Black Monday 
in October 1987 prices fell to a tenth of their pre crash level.  (Cosh, 
Hughes and  
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Table 9 
 
Standard Deviations of Developing and Developed Country Price Indexes 
(five years ending December 1989) 
 
{PRIVATE }Market Number of 
months 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean of 
% changes 
Latin America    
Argentina 60 37.05 7.14 
Brazil 60 21.07 2.51 
Chile 60 8.26 3.41 
Colombia 60 6.10 1.59 
Mexico 60 16.09 4.47 
Venezuela 60 11.59 0.29 
East Asia    
Korea 60 8.16 2.93 
Phillipines 60 11.15 5.62 
Taiwan, China 60 15.15 5.46 
South Asia    
India 60 8.76 1.56 
Malaysia 60 8.23 1.05 
Pakistan 60 2.92 0.33 
Thailand 60 7.90 2.69 
Europe/ 
Mideast/Africa 
   
Greece 60 12.39 2.45 
Jordan 60 5.41 0.00 
Nigeria 60 11.24 -1.00 
Portugal  47 18.17 5.53 
Turkey  36 23.67 4.90 
Zimbabwe 60 8.71 3.39 
IFC Regional Indexes    
Composite 60 7.06 2.14 
Latin America 60 13.91 2.14 
Asia 60 7.98 2.82 
Developed Markets    
USA (S&P 500) 60 5.16 1.39 
UK (FT-100) 60 5.88 1.31 
Japan (Nikkei) 60 4.08 2.17 
EAFE 60 5.25 2.61 
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   Since January 1986,  
   Since December 1986   
 Source: IFC [1990] 
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Singh, 1989).   In Taiwan, the largest third world stock market, between 
1987 and February 1990, the share price index rose by three hundred and 
thirty per cent to reach a peak of 12,600; the index then fell to a quarter of 
its value (3160) by September 1990.
25
  In 1989, the average value of 
shares traded for each three-hour trading day on the Taipei stock market 
was nearly three billion dollars.  That was one billion dollars a day more 
than in London, and more than half New York's trading. On August 28, 
1989, Taipei recorded a trading volume of 7.6 billion dollars.  The 
world's biggest stock market, Tokyo traded just 4.2 billions dollars worth 
of shares on the same day.
26
 
 
 A priori, the reasons for the greater price fluctuations on the third 
world stock markets should not be far to seek.  They could be ascribed to 
various imperfections and segmentation of the capital market, lack of 
adequate public information on corporate performance and other similar 
factors.  As the Economist noted in its leader of 9 September 1989 with 
respect to Taipei: `Taiwan's stock market is a rigged casino with a 
phenomenal turnover.  Its bank are constipated by a diet of state  control. 
 Its family-control firms equate a accountancy with taxevading creativity.  
Its courts react not just to the lawbooks, but to the nudges of the 
influential.  Critics say it is as free wheeling and corrupt as the 
Philippines, but then admit it is a free wheel that works.' (page 20). 
 
 There is however on the face of it an important puzzle with respect 
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  Financial Times, 20 Sept., 1990 
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 Economist, 9 Sept., 1989. 
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to this explanation of greater imperfections on the third world stock 
markets because  of their underdevelopment.  This puzzle arises from the 
academic work on the `efficient markets' hypotheses for the emerging 
markets.  A number of such investigations which have been carried out 
on these markets do not always reject the weak form of the hypothesis i.e. 
that share prices quickly incorporate all available information.  In a study 
of London, and Bombay stock markets Sharma and Kennedy [1975], 
found the Bombay market on this criterion to be no less efficient than the 
one in London
27
.  If the third world markets were as imperfect as they 
appear to be, one would not expect the efficient market hypothesis to hold 
even in a weak form.  The answer to this apparent conundrum lies in the 
fact that the non-rejection of `efficient market hypothesis' is not even a 
guarantee of `information-arbitrage' efficiency of share prices let alone 
that of `fundamental valuation' efficiency.  As Summers [1989] notes the 
non-rejection of the `efficient markets hypothesis' does not imply that 
therefore the converse must be true: the data may not reject a hypothesis of 
`inefficient' markets in the `information-arbitrage' sense either.   
VII.2  New Issues and Equity Financing 
 
 It was seen earlier that equity financing makes a very small 
contribution to the growth of corporations in the advanced countries - 
because of takeovers, in the US, and the UK, the equity market's net 
contribution to financing of corporate growth has in fact been negative in 
recent years.  However up to now very little information has been 
available on the patterns of corporate finance in developing countries.  In 
                                                 
    
27
 See also Sharma [1983]. 
 
 
  53 
the first study of its kind, Singh and Hamid (1991) have analysed 
corporate  financial structures in nine developing countries over the 
period 1980-1988.  The countries studied included: South Korea, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Mexico, Jordan and 
Zimbabwe.  Singh and Hamid's sample frame is the 50 largest  
manufacturing firms quoted on the stock markets in each of these 
countries. 
 
 This research reveals some very important differences in the 
financing of corporate growth in the developed and the developing 
countries.  As Table 10 shows, unlike the advanced country corporations, 
firms in the developing countries use external finance to a far larger 
extent.  For example, the median Korean corporation among the top 50 
financed nearly 90 per cent of its growth from external sources in the 
1980s; the corresponding figure for the median Mexican, Thai and 
Turkish 
 
 
  54 
Table 10 
All Countries: Top 50 Listed Companies in Manufacturing [1] 
Financing of Corporate Growth: Before and After Tax Retention Ratios [2] 
Internation and External Finance of Growth [2] and Changes in Internal Finance [3] 
: Median Values 
 
{PRIVA
TE 
}Period 
Country Retentio
n Ratio 
(B.T) 
L.T. 
(%) 
Retentio
n Ratio 
(A.T) 
L.T. 
(%) 
Internal 
Finance 
L.T. 
(%) 
External 
Finance 
Equity 
(%) 
AVG 
Extnl 
Finance 
LTD 
(%) 
Internal 
Finance 
CH 
(%) 
80-87 Korea 33.7 59.3 12.8 40.3 45.4 7.6 
80-86 Pakistan 30.2 46.2 58.3 12.3 16.1 -4.6 
80-87 Jordan 24.2 32.0 28.1 52.1 0.0 41.5 
83-87 Thailand N.A. 46.7 17.3 N.A. N.A. 23.1 
84-88 Mexico N.A. N.A. 17.1  76.0 2.9 14.9 
80-88 India 47.7 67.7 36.1 11.0 45.6 -12.6 
82-87 Turkey 16.0 24.4 18.1 60.5 15.5 13.2 
83-87 Malaysia 23.5 45.0 42.4 31.4 2.1 -7.7 
80-88 Zimbab 38.8 61.6 58.5 43.0 0.0 16.8 
 
 N.A. - Not available 
 [1]  Number of companies in Jordan is 35 and in Turkey is 38 
 [2]  Average value for the relevant period for each country 
 [3]  Percentage point changes from the average of the first two years to the average of the last two years of 
the period 
 [4]  Instead of "Net Assets", "Total Assets" are used. 
 *    Upper limit 
 
 Source: Singh and Hamid [1991] 
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corporations was, in each case, more than 80 per cent.  These are 
extremely high percentages relative to  the experience of developed 
countries (see Table 8).  Secondly, and equally significantly, in more than 
half the countries in the Singh and Hamid sample, the top corporations 
used much more equity, rather than debt, to finance the growth of their net 
assets in the last decade.  The largest quoted Jordanian firms financed 
more than 50 percent of their growth from equity issues and the biggest 
Turkish firms over 60 percent.  Although the median South Korean 
company used relatively more debt than equity, more than 40 percent of its 
growth was financed by equity. 
 
 If one considers patterns of corporate finance in an historical 
perspective, it is interesting to observe that in the United States also at an 
earlier stage of its development, the equity market was a much more 
important source of corporate finance than subsequently.  (See Table 11). 
 It might therefore be thought that developing countries today are simply 
repeating the history of advanced countries and that in the initial phases of 
development, equity finance is very important for firm growth.   
 
 This would however be a hasty conclusion.  This is because 
research suggests that the greater degree of equity financing in the United 
States at the turn of the century does not indicate so much the significance 
of new  
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Table 11 
 
Proportions of Total Financing Accounted for by Particular 
Sources of Funds: US 1901-1979: Flow of Funds Data 
 
{PRIVATE } 
 
 
Period 
 
Total Debt 
Total Sources 
(1) 
Long term 
 
Total Sources 
(2) 
Short Term 
Liabilities 
Total Sources 
(3) 
Internal 
Funds 
Total Sources 
(4) 
New Stock 
 
Total Sources 
(5) 
1901-12 .31 .23 .08 .55 .14 
1913-22 .29 .12 .17 .60 .11 
1923-29 .26 .22 .04 .55 .19 
1930-39 Negative Negative Negative 1.14 .19 
1940-45 .15 Negative .20 .80 .03 
1946-59 .30 .16 .14 .64 .05 
1960-69 .36 .18 .18 .62 .02 
19970-79 .45 .21 .24 .52 .03 
 
 Source: Taggart [1985] 
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share issues for financing corporate growth, but is rather a reflection of the 
gigantic merger movement which swept American industry during that 
period.
28
   The stock market was used by J.P. Morgan and others to float 
shares to carry out the huge amalgamations of that era.  Moreover in Italy, 
France, Germany, and Japan, even at an earliest stage in the development 
of these economies, the stock market played little role in the financing of 
firm growth; the banks were much more important in this respect.  In the 
UK the small provincial stock markets rather than London were indeed 
significant suppliers of finance to industrial firms.  Lazonick (1986) has 
however argued that the nature of this financing hindered rather than 
helped UK's international competitiveness and  economic growth. 
 
 In the developing countries today, with many of them enjoying a 
stock market boom in the 1980s, new issues seem to be a genuine source 
of finance for corporate expansion.  However, the important question is 
whether the development of the stock markets in these economies has led 
to an increase in aggregate savings or that it simply represents the 
substitution of one form of saving (say bank saving or government bonds) 
for another (purchase of corporate shares in the stock market).  There is 
little no evidence of an increase in aggregate savings for most developing 
countries as a result of greater new issue activity on the stock market.  In 
some of the countries (e.g. Mexico, Turkey,) the aggregate savings 
actually fell during the 1980s.  Even if aggregate savings do not rise in a 
country, for reasons outlined in the forgoing sections, it could be argued 
that the stock market is still useful in so far as it leads to a more efficient 
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allocation of these savings or to better corporate performance as a result of 
stock market exposure.  There is no evidence in the developing countries 
on the latter issue although as seen earlier the results of the research from 
advanced countries on the operations of the market for corporate control 
are far from reassuring.  With respect to more efficient allocation of 
savings, the high volatility of share prices on the developing countries 
stock markets and the apparent domination of many of these markets by 
speculators, does not augur well for this hypothesis either. 
 
 It has sometime been suggested that since the developing countries 
have regulated financial systems, speculation in the stock markets acts as 
release valve that in a free system will be expressed elsewhere.  However 
for all its faults, it is better to allow speculation in gold or real estate than 
in corporate shares which concern an economy's directly productive 
potential.  Moreover to the extent that it is thought necessary for the 
government to cater to the tastes of speculators, it is better to provide them 
with a lottery than a stock market where the underlying assets are nothing 
less than the country's industrial present and future. 
 
VII.3  Foreign Portfolio Investment 
 
 As noted in section 1, the WIDER Study Group has strongly argued 
the case for the encouragement of third world stock markets and their 
opening up to foreign investors in order to attract portfolio investment.  
The group assume that because of the debt crisis, further capital flows 
from banks to developing countries on a voluntary basis are unlikely for 
many years.  They however, foresee a great potential in foreign equity 
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investment.  The main reasons for their optimism on this score are the 
very large and rapidly increasing assets of the pension funds ,insurance 
companies and  other institutional investors in the advanced countries and 
their need for portfolio diversification.   
 
 In 1989, the total assets of these institutions were estimated to be of 
the order of $7.5 trillion; significantly, the rate of growth of these assets is 
about 15 % per annum.Approximately 10 % of the total institutional assets 
were held in foreign equities in 1989; the proportion accounted for by 
investments in the Emerging Markets was however extremely small, being 
merely about one fifth of one percent.Consequently,  the total value of the 
assets of non-residents in emerging markets in 1989 was only of the order 
of $ 15 billion.On the assumption that most of this investment took place 
over the previous five years, the WIDER Study Group suggest that this 
implies a net flow of investment to emerging markets of about $ 1 billion 
per annum on a balance of payments valuation basis  ( excluding 
valuation changes). 
 
 The latter figure is quite small compared even with the net outflow 
of resources which is currently taking place from the Latin American 
countries alone as a result of the debt crisis.It is of course paltry  in 
relation to the foreign resources which developing countries as a whole 
require if they are to restore their pre-1980 long term growth rates. 
Nevertheless, for economies which are severely foreign exchange 
constrained, almost any positive non-debt-creating inflow of foreign  
capital may be regarded as being useful.More importantly, however, the 
Study GROUP believe that on fairly conservative assumptions ( e.g. an 
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increase in the proportion of industrial countries institutional funds held in 
the Emerging Markets - let us call it the coefficient "k" - rising from 0.2 
percent in 1989 to 0.5 percent by the year 2000), the total value of 
investments of non-residents in the Emerging Markets will be of the order 
of $ 100 billion by the end of the century.This would imply a net inflow of 
foreign portfolio investment of $ 10 billion per annum on a balance of 
payments basis. Of course if the value of "k" were to increase to one 
percent, the foreign exchange benefits of these investments to the 
developing countries will be correspondingly larger. The latter value for k 
 will still imply that the Emerging Markets' share is no more than 5 to 6 % 
of total foreign equity holdings of institutional investors, compared with 
the ratio of total capitalisation of the Emerging to the Developed Markets 
of 11 % in 1989. The Study Group recommend that even if the more 
conservative estimates of the institutional investments in the Emerging 
Markets were to be realised, the  developing countries should consider 
abolishing capital controls so as to encourage foreign portfolio inflows. 
They further propose that the IMF's articles of agreement which permit 
such controls by poor countries be reconsidered. 
 
 The Study Group are right in their belief of the considerable scope 
for foreign portfolio investments in developing countries.  As Table 12 
indicates there is generally low correlation between share prices in the 
third world and advanced country stock markets; for some of the emerging 
markets the correlations have been negative during the period 1984 
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Table 12 
 
Correlation Coefficient Matrix of IFC Price Indexes for Emerging Markets and the Price Indexes for Advanced Countries 
(five years ending December 1989) 
{PRIV
ATE 
}USA  
1.00                       
UK  0.76 1.00                      
JPN  0.13 0.00 1.00                     
EAFE 0.41 0.42 -0.03 1.00                    
ARG -0.09 -0.06 -0.24 -0.15 1.00                   
BRA 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.09 -0.07 1.00                  
CHI 0.27 0.26 -0.21 0.15 -0.12 0.04 1.00                 
COL 0.11 0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.18 -0.09 0.34 1.00                
GRE 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.15 0.10 -0.18 0.18 0.29 1.00               
IND -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.19 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 -0.05 1.00              
JOR -0.03 0.01 0.8 -0.08 0.19 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 -0.07 -0.28 1.00             
KOR 0.28 0.18 0.17 0.16 -0.16 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.29 1.00            
MAL 0.52 0.59 0.14 0.21 -0.07 0.06 0.24 -0.13 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 1.00           
MEX 0.34 0.36 0.14 0.08 0.12 -0.10 0.35 0.10 0.20 0.02 -0.13 0.12 0.38 1.00          
NIG 0.10 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.08 -0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.06 -0.24 -0.12 1.00         
PAK -0.15 0.06 -0.16 0.10 0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.08 -0.19 0.09 -0.01 1.00        
PHI 0.19 0.16 0.04 0.21 -0.19 0.06 0.19 -0.04 0.05 -0.13 0.03 0.16 0.22 0.03 0.12 -0.08 1.00       
POR  0.15 0.26 0.11 0.36 -0.02 0.05 0.21 0.33 0.55 -0.14 -0.01 -0.04 0.18 0.38 -0.19 0.16 -0.13 1.00      
TAI 0.09 0.18 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.34 0.19 0.17 -0.05 -0.10 -0.20 0.15 0.41 -0.23 0.00 -0.17 0.44 1.00     
THA 0.30 0.46 0.03 0.13 -0.03 -0.05 0.29 0.14 0.26 -0.04 0.04 -0.21 0.48 0.43 -0.15 0.13 0.01 0.33 0.50 1.00    
TUR  0.19 0.13 0.25 0.03 0.32 0.02 0.25 0.12 0.26 0.03 -0.25 0.01 0.32 0.33 0.14 0.02 0.16 -0.33 0.14 0.22 1.00   
VEN -0.05 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.04 -0.14 -0.17 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.22 -0.07 0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.15 -0.04 0.08 -0.10 0.00 0.07 1.00  
ZIM -0.13 -0.15 -0.15 0.04 -0.30 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.13 0.18 -0.28 -0.02 -0.14 -0.03 0.21 0.05 0.16 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 0.07 1.00 
 USA UK  Jpn  EAFE Arg Bra Chi Col Gre Ind Jor Kor Mal Mex Nig Pak Phi Por  Tai Tha Tur  Ven Zim 
   S&P 500 
   FT-100 
   Nikkei 
   Since January 1986 
   Since December 1986 
 Source: IFC [1990] 
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1989.
29
  This makes investment in third world markets attractive for 
pension funds and other institutional investors in advanced economies for 
portfolio diversification and risk spreading.  Nevertheless, as suggested in 
the analysis of the earlier sections there is a serious negative side to the 
Study Groups proposals to which they seem not to have given sufficient 
attention.  To briefly recapture the main points, first the abolition of 
capital controls will make the national economy much more vulnerable 
both to international macro-economic fluctuations as well as to capital 
flight.   Further, in view of the destabilising feedbacks between the 
financial and the currency markets, it will make the task of exchange rate 
management, and hence of inflation, much more difficult.   Secondly, for 
reasons explained in Section VI stock market development may damage 
industry - financial relationships and harm investment, competitiveness 
and the real economy.  Thirdly, if the Study Group's proposals are 
adopted, most of this portfolio investment is likely to go to a small number 
of the most developed third world economies with large corporations and 
relatively well organised stock markets rather than to a majority of the 
poor countries. 
 
 The Study Group argue that fostering stock market development 
will among other things discourage capital flight and in fact bring flight 
capital back since the market gives wealth holders an attractive alternative 
vehicle for domestic investment.  This argument is plausible but 
deceptive.  This is because capital flight is essentially a consequence of 
financial and macro economic instability; of course in turn it also 
                                                 
    
29
 See also Cosh, Hughes and Singh [1989]; IMF [1989]. 
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exacerbates such instability.  The existence of a stock market per se is 
unlikely to help in this respect.  In unstable economic conditions, stock 
market volatility on the contrary could enhance financial instability and in 
fact lead to capital flight not least by foreign portfolio investors. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 No attempt will be made here to systematically summarise  the 
arguments and the analysis of the previous sections.   Essentially this 
paper suggests that it is arguable that even in advanced countries with well 
functioning markets, the stock markets more likely do more harm than 
good to the real economy.  The supposed positive contributions of the 
stock markets (encouragement of savings, more efficient allocation of 
investment resources, the discipline of corporate managements through 
competitive selection in the market for corporate control), for all the 
reasons discussed earlier, do not materialise in practice.  The market for 
corporate control encourages large companies to expand through 
takeovers rather than to seek organic growth which promotes economic 
development.  Moreover, it is not at all clear that the takeover selection 
process leads to the survival of firms which are efficient at creating real 
wealth rather than being simply skilled in financial engineering.   
 
 There is evidence as well as strong analytical grounds for believing 
that these and related negative features of the stock markets (speculation, 
lack of long term investor commitment to corporations, short termism) 
may play a significant role in putting the stock market dominated 
economies of the United States and the United Kingdom at a competitive 
disadvantage in relation to countries such as West Germany and Japan.   
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These unfavourable aspects of the stock market are likely to be 
particularly important in third world countries with undeveloped stock 
markets and high volatility of share prices.  
 
 To the extent that developing countries today have a choice they 
should attempt to foster bank-based financial systems more along the lines 
of the `follower' countries (Japan, West Germany, France) rather than to 
establish and encourage stock markets.  Historically, these bank-based 
systems have a proven record of successfully promoting industrial 
development in these countries. Moreover, as we have seen earlier, the 
modern theory of information provides strong theoretical reasons for 
banks to be on the whole more suitable vehicles for achieving these ends 
than the stock market.  The ordinary shareholder of a large corporation 
has neither the ability nor the incentive to obtain the necessary information 
 (which is costly) to monitor management activities, thus leading him or 
her to eschew "commitment" to the organization and to prefer liquidity. 
The banks, on the other hand, have both the means and the incentive to 
collect such information  and to take a long term view of firms' prospects 
- a perspective  which is vital for industrialization in developing 
economies.  
 
 Notwithstanding these extremely important advantages of 
bank-based financial systems, it would be a mistake not to learn from the 
experience of the last two decades when, in many developing countries, 
such systems have performed far from adequately. In a number of 
developing countries experiencing a high degree of macro-economic 
instability, bank-based finance has tended to degenerate into 
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inflationary/inefficient finance.  Experience suggests the following to be 
the most serious shortcomings of such systems in the developing country 
context:  
 
(a) "crony capitalism", which finances schemes of particular individuals 
and families with political connections, rather than promote long term 
industrial development;   
 
(b) industry-finance links of the bank-based type can in principle, and 
sometimes in practice, lead to monopolistic positions in product markets 
and thwart entry by new firms, thereby hindering efficient industrial 
development;   
 
(c) imprudent or inadequate government regulation of the banks has 
sometimes jeopardized the integrity of the financial system as a whole (for 
example Chile, following financial liberalization in the early 1980s).  
 
 Thus although bank-based systems are much to be preferred in 
principle to the stockmarket-based systems, the developing countries 
should pay particular attention to questions of proper regulation and to the 
prevention of monopolistic abuse by the banks.    
 
 However, to be realistic, it must be recognised that the 
stockmarkets in developing countries are today a part of the new economic 
landscape and notwithstanding their dubious merits in relation to 
economic development, they are there to stay.  The question, therefore, 
arises how, if at all, can  their negative features be contained?  The 
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analysis of previous sections suggests that from the perspective of 
economic development, an important general policy principle for the ldcs 
should be to attempt to insulate as far as possible the real industrial 
economy from the influence of the stock market.  In this context, the 
following kinds of policy proposals require careful consideration by 
developing country governments.  First, they should examine schemes of 
taxation to reduce share turnover as was mooted by Keynes and has more 
recently been proposed by Tobin in relation to transactions on the 
international currency markets.   
 
 Secondly, the developing countries should be seriously concerned 
about the effects  of a prospective market for corporate control.  Since 
stockmarkets in these countries are still in their infancy, most of them do 
not yet have an active market for corporate control (although some 
takeover bids on the Indian stockmarkets have been reported in the most 
recent period). However, as the stockmarkets become more  mature and 
more firmly established, left to itself, the development of a corporate 
control market is an inevitable evolution. As seen earlier, such a market 
greatly accentuates the negative features of a stockmarket for economic 
development ( e.g. by encouraging short-termism ). The developing 
countries should, therefore, if at all possible, adopt the German-Japanese 
type institutional arrangements to pre-empt the development of a market 
for corporate control of the kind which exists in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. However, if that is not feasible, these countries would be wise 
to take steps to restrict the operations of the market for corporate control.  
This may involve for example major changes in company law, reducing 
the role of shareholders and enhancing that of the stake-holders or the 
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government in takeover situations.  Some of these proposals in relation to 
the market for corporate control in the UK are examined in Cosh, Hughes 
and Singh (1990). 
 
  Thirdly to the extent that institutional investors such as pension 
funds are public agencies which appears to be the case in many 
developing countries, the governments could use them to maintain more 
orderly markets.  Fourthly, and importantly, the governments should 
encourage product market competition to discipline corporations rather 
than to rely on the stock market for this purpose.  If a developing country 
possesses or is able to establish a German-Japanese type financial system, 
such discipline would be supplemented by the bank monitoring of 
corporations. 
 To reduce the negative aspects of the role of the stock market 
would require a full exploration of the policy areas outlined above in 
relation to the specific circumstances of a particular country.  Many of 
these policy issues are currently subjects of considerable debate in the 
advanced countries.  Their application and analysis in relation to 
developing country stock markets requires a separate paper in its own 
right. 
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